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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Anticipating the ultimate innovation, volitional evolution: can it not be
promoted or attempted responsibly?
Lantz Fleming Miller*
Philosophy Department, City University of New York Graduate Center, New York, USA
(Received 22 July 2014; accepted 8 October 2015)
The aspiration for volitional evolution, or human evolution directed by humans themselves, has
increased in philosophical, scientific, technical, and commercial literature. The prospect of
shaping the very being who is the consumer of all other innovations offers great commercial
potential, one to which all other innovations would in effect be subservient. Actually an
amalgam of projected technical/commercial developments, this prospective innovation has
practical and ethical ramifications. However, because it is often discussed in a scientific way
(specifically that of evolutionary theory), it first calls for examination in terms of common
scientific approaches to evolution. Yet, as evolutionary-theory controversies point up,
evolution may be considered as neither a directed nor a directable process – a problem for
the ontology of volitional evolution. One challenge for theories and programs aiming to
implement the proposed innovation is then whether it is theoretically coherent. While I offer
responses to the challenge in the form of objections, these in turn remain problematic. Two
central issues of responsible innovation arise: (1) If this prospect were feasible, would it be
responsible to implement it, and (2) if it is not even theoretically coherent, is it responsible
for innovators, even this early-on, to keep promoting it as if it were?
Keywords: emerging technologies; ethical responsibility; natural selection; responsible
innovation; volitional evolution
The philosophical and technical literature has seen extensive discussion about the possibility of
volitional evolution (Bostrom 2004; Hughes 2006; Harris 2007; Buchanan 2012).1 The
concept is variously stated, sometimes as ‘controlling’ or ‘directing our own evolution’
(Bostrom 2004), ‘intervening in our evolution’ (Hughes 2006), or even ‘breaking evolution’s
chains’ (Buchanan and Powell 2011). I use E.O. Wilson’s ‘volitional evolution’ (1999, 299) as
the most succinct term. The concept seems to be that, as blind natural forces have shaped and con-
tinue to shape life, it should be possible for humans, using artificial means, to shape life into new
forms as they see fit. Darwin (1952) borrowed the term ‘natural selection’ from the artificial selec-
tion used in horticulture. The recent ‘re-reversal’ of the term back to an innovative type of arti-
ficial selection is commonly made with an eye on prospective technologies as the tools for
humans themselves to effect a new, controlled selection.
This concept has both rhetorical force and metaphysical appeal. According to this concept, a
plausible assumption is that, while human beings have been shaped by forces outside their
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control, they have emerged with at least a limited power and will to direct their own evolutionary
destinies. They can use that limited power and will to take more control from the very forces that
formed them. Humans should be able to overcome any natural limitations upon that will and
thereby finesse more direct management of their own evolutionary destinies – seemingly both
individually and as a species. The metaphysical appeal then, is that humans no longer have to
be crushed by fate or blind forces but can chart out the very kind of agents they want to be.
As this feat is to be accomplished, in the current volitional-evolutionary context, by an assort-
ment of diverse new technological innovations, it becomes the master innovation over them all,
providing an organizing principle putting this assortment into a well-defined order and giving the
consumer a potentially strong sense of direction and purpose. This paper’s final question is
whether such an ultimate innovation, if it were feasible, would be ethically responsible; and if
it is not feasible, is it responsible to continue promoting it to the consuming public as though
it were.
I must note preliminarily that while many of the current proposals for ‘human enhancement’, or
more precisely, human improvement via emerging-techniques2 (HIVE)may characterize their goal
as volitional evolution, not all HIVE programs do so. All those advocates who foresee a prospect of
volitional evolution are not necessarily supporters of HIVE, either. The paper’s concern, then, is
with those proposals for HIVE that do characterize their ongoing program as that of volitional evol-
ution. It then endswith a normative objection to such programs’ use of this scientific terminology to
characterize their program. It is not directly concerned with the ethics of HIVE programs per se, but
since the discussion does bring in this normative element, it eventually assays the normative
element – includingwhy the paper upholds this element as so important – in light of some assertions
that HIVE programs are ethically obligatory.
One further preliminary clarification about the discussion is as follows: There may be some
concern whether volitional evolution is indeed an isolable, sufficiently singular innovation to
warrant assessment of its innovators’ potential ethical responsibility. It may instead seem to be
a class of innovations, such as HIVE (with which it is often affiliated). It may also be seen as
a bundle of innovations, rather than a single product. However, I believe that, if ‘volitional evol-
ution’ were possible and is a category, then it is a more specific, narrow, and clear category of
innovations than, say ‘human enhancement’ because it refers to a given objective scientific
fact, that of natural evolution. Its promoters often contend that, now we have attained a level
of technical development, we can effect this same sort of factual process ourselves. By contrast,
‘human enhancement’ is vague, referring to the subjective sense of what is better or enhanced, for
which there is no precise objective scientific fact. (see Section 3.1) Even if there were objective
methods for assessing the quality of a HIVE product, there is no one standard as to what is an
enhancement, as there would be for what is a process of evolution.
Further, most innovations come within a category, and that abstract category may be as worth-
while for ethical assessment as specific products within it, or more so. Thus, in the case of voli-
tional evolution, assessment of the category is especially dire because the innovation of volitional
evolution – if indeed, commensurate with the scientific understanding of evolution – could well
be one of the most powerful innovations yet, with far-reaching implications and ramifications, as
evolution is the very process that makes us – the consumers – what we are. All subsequent inno-
vations could well be subservient to it.
In short, for ethical evaluation of its potential implementation, volitional evolution can effec-
tively be treated as a product innovation because it involves moral agents’ undertaking delibera-
tive action using an innovated product or products for the sake of achieving a discrete aim, that of
evolving as a species being in some manner.
This paper is organized into three major sections. The first looks at what volitional evolution
may consist in to see just what it may be referring to as a type of action. Here, many obscurities
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remain. The next section then puts the concept into the more specific context of evolutionary
theory to see just what kind of evolution is to be effected in the process. Still, even in this
more well-defined context, the concept remains unclear. As evolutionary theory is both
complex and not unified within the biology community, this section is the most extensive. In
the third section, I return to the question of whether in any case it is morally responsible to
promote this innovation for the consuming public.
1. Usage of a concept
1.1. A tradition of usage
Many commentators advocating volitional evolution assert that it is continuing a longstanding
goal, dating at least from Darwin, for humanity to take the reins of evolution into its own
hands and dictate to nature what it wants to become (Bostrom 2008; Bostrom and Sandberg
2008).3 Darwin did, in fact, sometimes hint at such a perfectionist, directed evolution (and poss-
ibly volitional if in ‘looking to’ we are somehow participating in the process), as in the following:
As all the living forms of life are the lineal descendants of those which lived long before the Silurian
epoch, we may feel certain that the ordinary succession by generation has never once been broken, and
that no cataclysm has desolated the whole world. Hence we may look with some confidence to a
secure future of equally inappreciable length. And as natural selection works solely by and for the
good of each being, all corporeal and mental environments will tend to progress towards perfection.
(Darwin 1952, 243)
In The New Synthesis, Huxley (1957) overtly propounded the concept of volitional evolution:
‘The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself… in its entirety, as humanity… the human
species will be on the threshold of a new kind of existence, as different from ours as ours is from
that of Pekin [sic] man’. (17) Whether Darwin and Huxley were correct in projecting humanity’s
perfectionism, the revolutionary formulation of evolution that Darwin helped formulate, via The
Origin of Species, and Huxley to a lesser degree via The New Synthesis, has continued to be refor-
mulated, expanded, and detailed. It is in this ongoing and expanding scientific context in which
the concept of volitional evolution must be examined vis-à-vis the basic term ‘evolution’.
Before exploring the ways in which ‘volitional evolution’ can be interpreted within the scien-
tific usages of ‘evolution’, it is enlightening to inquire first into what volitional evolution could
involve, as a concept in its own right and as a type of action, however the term is used in the
sciences.
1.2. The concept behind the usage
Considering volitional evolution to be the umbrella term for the general concept of humans’
directing their own biological evolution, the following should apply whatever specific term is
used for the concept. If humans can now or very soon control their evolution as they may will,
just as they may will to take a peach ice cream over the 30 other flavors in the freezer, it is
germane to ask who is doing the choosing. Furthermore, what exactly are they choosing to
do? A prima facie interpretation plausibly holds that the species Homo sapiens can now evolve
into the next species – call it Homo supersapiens – just as H. sapiens evolved from Homo
erectus. Only now instead of blind evolutionary forces, whatever these are, it is acts of will of
the collective force of H. sapiens itself that accomplish the feat. The next question about this
process is just how may the collective effort of H. sapiens accomplish this feat? Apparently,
all 7+ billion (probably more by the time of any such program’s implementation) somehow are
Journal of Responsible Innovation 3
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to exert actions so that in a few generations, perhaps the next, their offspring will be the new
species Homo supersapiens. If the evolution is to continue, as the whole concept seems to antici-
pate, the next species will in turn exert a concerted effort, ad libitum. If this is the interpretation
that the concept’s proponents intend (I doubt it is), it would require unprecedented cooperation by
the world’s population. Not only would all persons have to operate with an unusual synchrony to
execute the program, they would have to agree to it. Perhaps this scenario is possible upon pro-
pagating duly convincing polemics and expensive educational programs training consumers in
the evolution-causing techniques. However, little in the literature has given attention to the for-
midable practical and legal problems of implementing such polemicization, much less discussed
the costs and the financial, political, and personal motivations for carrying out the program. One
must consider why most people the world over would elect to make such an investment so that
their future distant relatives could be a new species. This caveat is not to deny that a very convin-
cing polemic could be generated. It is only to point out that this enormous unprecedented chal-
lenge needs solution to make the project feasible.
Most volitional-evolution proponents likely would not endorse this prima facie interpretation
of volitional evolution. An alternative would hold that certain select leaders could be given the
task of taking over the project, and the majority of the people would passively sit by and let
the process proceed. However, either the polemicization problem remains, or those in charge
will have to work their will upon the populations, who may well object. The latter choice may
invoke significant political and moral problems (see Miller 2014b). Furthermore, this moral
problem in turn poses more practical challenges: If the population dictatorially imposed upon
rises up in violent rebellion, or the regime imposes its will no matter what, the outcome brings
into question the whole structure and plan of the program. If it is to evolve a more peaceful or
willingly cooperative H. sapiens than currently exists, it is founding itself upon a violent begin-
ning. (Of course, if the program aims on generating a more violent species or one that cooperates
without question or will, in this very program for violence or servitude it again runs into ethical
problems that may be difficult to ignore rationally. Thus, the whole program becomes irrational
and beyond the scope of the rational conversation that interlocutors apparently are attempting at
this stage.)
An alternative interpretation is that volitional evolution does not really mean that the entire
species shall evolve but only those who elect to do so. For example, a small group, perhaps of
a few hundred colleagues, may meet and contract to undertake together operations X, Y, Z
upon their genetic structure. They also agree to isolate themselves and offspring for a few gener-
ations, until the genetic alterations have securely taken hold in later generations of offspring.
These offspring can then remain sufficiently isolated from the non-altered population that they
could safely be said to have speciated (see Section 2.3).
This scenario seems at least conceivable. However, it is apparent that those undertaking the
evolutionary activity are not themselves evolving. They are not evolving at will but are exerting
their will, upon others, to create a new species of those others. For some proponents, this fact may
be of minor concern. But it is not clear that these people are doing significant evolution-control,
unless they are content with a one-stop deal. They must as well design the new organism so that it
willingly carries out yet another program to evolve new creatures from their grand-offspring. This
scenario means some sophisticated genetic designing of the brain of the Homo superspiens – and
ensuring that the latter species cannot reverse that brain-designing so as to block future volitional
evolution. But then this feature means a reduced will of the volitionally evolved species; so they
are no longer willing their own evolution. The program reaches a self-destructing inconsistency.
A related possible interpretation of volitional evolution is that it is individual human beings
who may elect to evolve. Thus, agent A in Italy one day elects to evolve, another time agent B in
Belarus does, and so on. The process transforms the individual into another kind of being that is
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not H. sapiens. Curiously, this scenario has fewer logical problems than the previous three dis-
cussed. It merely calls on the agent to lose sufficient critical portions of one’s humanity so as
no longer to be that species but, apparently, enough of an organismal identity tout court, retaining
sufficient portions, so as to ensure that organism B is indeed the thing changed. This stipulation
may be thought of as one of Minimal Theoretical Reversibility; thus, enough of the former B
remains in B′ so that B′ could revert to B. The assumption is that if not enough of B remains in
B´, B is not becoming something else but has been completely lost. If all the particles of B
were to be placed into the middle of a blue star, B would not become another thing but would
cease to exist. However, even with this stipulation, it is difficult to say what B is doing besides
simply changing identity. At this point, then, it is time to turn to Section 2 to distinguish
between scientific understanding of evolution vs. simply changing.
First, a final interpretation is warranted, which is to take some of the weight off the willingness
and directedness of volitional evolution: The species, by gradually deploying, piecemeal, one
form or other of new techniques and incorporating them more intimately and intrinsically into
their lives, beings, bodies, minds, cannot help but in some way – one group bulging out this
way, another subgroup stretching out that way – to become another kind of species. It is not a
deliberate move toward a planned evolution. It is instead the operation of wills, willy-nilly, in
the market place, as they opt for technique T here, techniqueU there, that lends them to potentially
evolving into something else. This interpretation is disingenuous, though, and loses all the force
of the volitional-evolution concept: It would not be humans controlling their own evolution but
pursuing their usual species and cultural habits that just may (or may not) lead to evolution.
It is hard to see, in a preliminary non-technical sense, exactly how the project for volitional
evolution is to shape up when translated into practice. Next I examine how the concept of voli-
tional evolution squares up with the scientific notion of evolution.
2. Volitional evolution in the context of scientific theories of evolution
Like many technical terms, ‘evolution’ also has a non-technical usage. This fact, when context
offers insufficient indication of whether the usage is strictly technical, can lead to confusion.
The term ‘evolution’ is further complicated by the fact that scientific usages of ‘evolution’ are
not as singularly or mathematically defined as those of other scientific terms such as ‘energy’
or ‘entropy’. The concept of volitional evolution then demands examination in context of this
fuzziness.
2.1. Three major uses of ‘evolution’: with narrow or wide technical scope or non-technical
To simplify the discussion, I focus primarily upon basic notions of evolution that are common to
most current theories. However, one of the greatest challenges to doing so is to establish – or, at
worst, to pretend there exists – a single, unified notion of evolution as a standard against which to
measure any concept of evolution in general. One danger is making a version of a straw-man argu-
ment, establishing a notion of evolution that cuts across all theories and yet is cherry-picked and
leaves no place for volitional evolution. I believe that danger is slight, compared with the chal-
lenge of finding a notion of evolution that satisfies most evolutionary theories. A similar
concern is that in support of volitional evolution, one can always select those aspects of an evol-
utionary theory which seem consistent with volitional evolution, while inconsistent with the more
ecumenical presentation of evolution which I aim to provide. Given these challenges, I can only
leave it to the reader to judge whether this broader presentation sufficiently covers the common
ground among theories.
Journal of Responsible Innovation 5
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Within the scientific and philosophical communities debates abound concerning adaptation
(Dennett 1995), exaptation (Gould and Lewontin 1979; Pinker 1997), teleology (Reiss 2009),
developmentalism (Pigliccui 2001; Müller and Newman 2005), and other issues. Bringing
these debates into this paper can only complicate its discussion without significantly affecting
its point because in these theories the underlying concepts of evolution are what are relevant to
the concept of volitional evolution.
Although many readers are well-acquainted with basic evolutionary concepts, I begin with
foundational definitions to give the discussion a clear grounding and direction. First, in technical
terms, evolution can have a narrow scope (focusing on small changes) or a wider scope (larger or
long-term changes). Sometimes biologists define evolution, at its simplest, genetic level, as the
change in allele frequency in a population. In other words, ‘Evolution, at its simplest, is…
defined as any change in the hereditary composition of a population’ (Savage 1977, 47). Such
changes are often considered ‘microevolution’. Divergent evolution or speciation requires micro-
evolution, but not all microevolution – in fact, probably little of it – leads to speciation. Micro-
evolution can be observed in the laboratory, but it is unlikely that speciation, at least through
natural forces such as genetic drift, mutation, and natural selection of adaptive traits, will be
seen in the lab soon, because these forces (at least in natural history) seem to operate over
long periods.
Another, wider scope, technical sense of ‘evolution’ is of divergence: large, long-term
changes involved in speciation. In fact, this sense is the more well-known technical notion of
evolution as the process that, over eons, gives rise to new species. In turn, species undergo extinc-
tion, another evolutionary process. A species may predominate in large numbers for a period, then
fade for a while, and possibly resurge or not. Unfortunately, ‘species’, perhaps more so than evol-
ution itself, is not a well-defined technical term, although biologists still carry out their work suc-
cessfully within a union of a large set of criteria that define most recognized species (Claridge,
Dawah, and Wilson. 1997; Hey 2001; Pigliucci 2003). As evolution is an ever-shifting, never-
ending process in which all organisms participate, one may safely say that species-production
is not a goal but a result of evolution. Species – certain populations of organisms in certain
ways distinct from others as a type – are continually appearing and disappearing. Speciation
itself may have resulted from certain contingencies in the way life originally developed, such
as the reproduction of basic chemicals leading to life’s genetic basis (Dawkins 1976) and
hence the reproductive strategies (sexual and asexual) that developed consequent to this
genetic basis (Baraclough and Herniou 2003). That is, this genetic basis of primordial life
exerted a strong selection pressure favoring reproduction and eventually sexual reproduction,
and these in turn further influenced the shape of survival and adaptive strategies in an ever-shift-
ing (and so naturally selecting) environment.4
Besides these unwieldy but useful technical usages, ‘evolution’ has perhaps wider currency as
meaning simply ‘ongoing change of an entity’. Thus people speak of a child’s evolving as it
grows, a company’s evolving in response to social changes, or an idea such as ‘evolution’
itself evolving over the centuries. An idea, child, or company is not composed of genes, even
if the parts of some are composed partly of DNA (viz. humans being a part of a company).
And while a child is composed partly of DNA, its changing as it grows is not evolution in the
technical sense.5
2.2. An ambiguity and attempted disambiguation
Volitional evolution is ambiguous in terms of these various senses of ‘evolution’. However, dis-
ambiguation leads to difficulties in all three senses. Start with the narrow scope of the technical
sense, change in allele frequency of a population. If ‘volitional evolution’ implies ‘volitional
6 L.F. Miller
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microevolution’, the concept is feeble. One reason is that even the technical definition, while
useful as an heuristic for assessing population characteristics in field biology and as an atomistic
basis for explanations of larger, divergent macroevolution, loses strength when used out-of-
context because of the vagueness of ‘change in frequency’ and ‘population’. Secondly, human
history (and probably prehistory) is peppered with conscious efforts at controlling gene frequency
in populations, even if people in pre-genetics eras did not know they were ‘changing an allele
frequency’. A musically inclined person from a small musically illiterate town, in marrying a
musical person and having children, may represent – if musical ability has genetic basis – an
attempt to change an allele’s frequency in a population. Movements of whites from mixed U.
S. neighborhoods in the 1950s and beyond were attempts to control the frequency of a popu-
lation’s melanin alleles, even if the moves were not overtly considered as such. As Ashkenazi
Jews have a relatively high frequency of the gene for Tay-Sachs disease, the twentieth-century
Shoah was an exercise in control of the frequency of an allele in the European population
(even if the perpetrators did not intend specifically to control that allele frequency). Biologists
have long noted that, because of the complexities of human culture, it is much more difficult
to pin down certain concepts and their definitions which work well in the field for non-human
species, so that the terms may be readily applied to human population genetics (Lewontin
1972, 1995).
Proponents of volitional evolution may be anticipating the control of human microevolution
in terms of adding, say, to-be-discovered genes for intelligence or longevity. If enough people
were to insert such genes into their somatic and germ cells, it may be said they would have delib-
erately altered an allele frequency in a population and so effected microevolution. If so, they have
introduced a new type of technique for effecting microevolution. However, in the context of all
prehistory, nothing new or outstanding would have been effected, no more than done by two
musical persons’ marrying one another, or whites fleeing blacks, in offering a new technique
for effecting microevolution. Volitional evolution then would hardly be of moment, something
humans and animals have been doing for eons without any notable change in the species or bring-
ing about speciation.
More likely, considering, for example, the magnitude of some volitional evolution projects,
the concept concerns divergent evolution. Literature on the subject often refers to humans indu-
cing their speciation into a new species (Hughes 2006), anticipating how current humans, com-
pared with a heavily altered organism derived from humans by HIVE, may one day seem like
what an insect does to a current human (Vinge 1993).6 The implication is that, by humans
taking evolution into their own hands, they would be controlling and directing future instances
of divergent evolution. Resolving this issue, though, involves breaking it down further: Is voli-
tional evolution looking toward speciation, macroevolution, or megaevolution? Some voli-
tional-evolution proponents may be looking toward megaevolution several dozen or hundred
years into the project, while more moderate volitional evolutionists may be looking only to spe-
ciation for the time being. In any case, any divergent evolution must go through the gate of spe-
ciation. It is useful, then, to investigate how volitional speciation can be effected.7
2.3. Volitional speciation
Speciation is the process by which new species appear. While the concept of species continues to
be debated, species may, in the most widely accepted understanding, be considered as a popu-
lation of individuals who are capable of interbreeding with one another to produce viable, repro-
ducing offspring or who are otherwise isolated from breeding with other populations. A deme is a
subpopulation of a species which is genetically similar and ‘bearing a temporal and spatial
relation’ to one another (Savage 1977, 104). Individuals of different demes may at times
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interbreed with one another. But in time, one deme may become reproductively isolated from
another; these isolating processes may lead to speciation. Some kind of isolation is a necessary
but insufficient condition for speciation. The essential ingredients are some combination of: vari-
ation, selection, and genetic drift.8 If, among species populations that become isolated, a signifi-
cant genetic variation is introduced, that variation is eventually selected; so it becomes endemic in
the population, and if enough such novel traits finally preclude interbreeding of that population
with others, speciation has some possibility of occurring.
Effecting control over speciation then requires effecting this process. That is, one must repro-
ductively isolate individuals, introduce genetic variation, and have that variation naturally
selected for until it is endemic in the population to the point that the population can no longer
interbreed with other populations. Consider now someone who intends to effect such control. Pre-
liminarily, this project could face some obstruction to population reproductive isolation because
humans by and large extensively intermingle reproductively, especially now as modes of transport
proliferate worldwide and expats grow commoner. The trend is overwhelmingly away from, not
toward, such isolation in our species. Even isolated tribes in the New Guinea mountains are
increasingly exposed to outsiders. If such groups were to make efforts to remain isolated, they
are not those that most volitional-evolution proposals are explicitly targeting. In any case, a pro-
ponent of volitional evolution can object to this issue of isolation: (1) We could isolate either
through new methods, such as free-floating artificial islands or space colonies; or (2) This iso-
lation condition may not be necessary for further human evolution, as it is only contingent: In
the past, this condition was that by which the process so happened to work, so that newly intro-
duced variations had a chance to spread in such a way as to be different from the kindred group
long enough to speciate. That is, what is important in isolation is giving variations a chance to
catch on long enough that natural selection favors them and they become definitional of the
new species, and such catching on can be achieved by other means at our discretion.
Conceding this interpretation of (the contingency of) reproductive isolation and the prospect
that a volitional evolution project can provide the requisite genetic variation for change through
biotechnology: The project then involves, say, injecting individuals with genes that are useful in
society, such as genes for health, intelligence, and beauty (HIB). The next big step is natural selec-
tion. This ‘force’ may seem readily accessible to the project. Those individuals who receive the
genetic boost are candidates for selection. If they thrive and reproduce, they will pass along their
variation. If that variation proves so worthy over time, it continues providing fitness to gener-
ations; and if populations do get isolated (say in outer space), divergence may occur. Otherwise,
we will simply witness a subpopulation expressing these genes.
However, problems arise for this scenario, vis-à-vis evolution: (1) This process is still not
divergent evolution by microevolution and is nothing new, unless reproductive divergence
does occur and those variations persist long enough (are naturally selected for) to form new
species, which is still hardly a case of volitional evolution. (2) The injected genes may or may
not prove to bestow fitness over the long range. Cultures, societies, and the physical environment
change; these are the conditions that bring about the natural selection. As evolutionary history
shows well, abrupt environmental changes may select against such highly specialized genotypes
(Dasgupta 1995; O’Brien, Wildt, and Bush 1997).
But, the objection may continue, by noting that while speciation may not yet occur within the
genetically injected population, such variation is a step toward the possibility of speciation. And,
more importantly, the point of controlling our own evolution is that we control the environment
that is doing the selecting. We create the sophisticated cultures and economies that require
superior HIB (SHIB), and then we supply the genotypes for SHIB that can best fulfill such an
environmental niche.
8 L.F. Miller
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However, it is important to consider what established the preliminary criteria for the cultures
that esteem SHIB to such an extent that the volitional-evolution project tries shaping the environ-
ment to fulfill these criteria maximally. The evolutionary process over millennia shaped humans
as biological and cultural beings with certain needs. In other words, humans to this point have
been beings who have certain needs, and cultures are social structures that serve, in their
varied ways, partly to express and fulfill those needs. A culture may not express or answer all
of those needs for every individual, but without the organism and its needs, there would be no
culture. Cultures supervene on human biology. They – as a human phenomenon as a whole –
are as much an outcome of evolution as is the biological organism. Criteria for valuing HIB (if
not the criteria for beauty itself) are established and communicated through culture. Thus, the
evolutionary process established the basis for these criteria in the first place.
The objection may concede, and even celebrate, the fact that evolution could then be said to
have established not only these criteria, but the valuing for HIB as well. Thus it would seem that
the project itself could be viewed as an outgrowth of natural selection. However, that conclusion
would counter the volitional evolution project’s very goal of wresting control from the evolution-
ary process to this point (‘evolution proper’). That is, whatever is done in attempting volitional
evolution is still done under the auspices of evolution proper. There is no intervening ‘volitional
evolution’ that somehow breaks out of this process and sets out on its own. What exactly makes
volitional evolution a distinct project then needs clarification.
2.4. Bridging the classic gap between normativity and science
Understandably, a further objection would be that, even if you do not want to call it ‘volitional
evolution’, we take certain good qualities that evolution has given us, such as HIB, and emphasize
these, while ‘evolving out of existence’ bad qualities, such as disease, fatuity, and ugliness. We
simply refuse to take everything evolution has handed us. Where formerly it selected traits, we
now do the selecting – of the best qualities it so happened to provide us. We please everyone
by maximizing these qualities across cultures (to minimize differences in criteria of, say,
beauty or intelligence).
However, the introduction of the normative criteria ‘good’ and ‘bad’ into the discussion
creates a further difficulty, to which I return. A volitional-evolution program may anticipate
any difficulty here by preempting it, by maximizing the qualities across cultures for widest poss-
ible appeal – that is, for maximizing ‘good’ over ‘bad’. But this move would only corroborate and
compound the problem: Introducing the ‘good’ and ‘bad’, as well as the issue of maximizing what
are most widely considered good qualities, not only assumes that ‘good’ is what receives the
greatest number of votes, but also confirms that some people may not approve, or that the
project is trying to gain everyone’s at least minimal approval. Simply, the proposal signifies
that approval is sought. And yet, if approval is not gained, by unanimity or plurality or majority,
then what? The project is trapped not in a scientific but a normative quagmire. No matter how
much the project asserts ‘Everyone wants to get rid of fatuity, disease, and ugliness’, the
problem remains that, now that these are deemed ‘bad’, the criteria for them are not clear-cut
and some people may not approve. At best the criteria can only be approximated by the sort of
computer-assisted blends of human faces that derive the optimal fit that pleases the most
people and offends the fewest (Jones, Little, and Perritt 2003). Yet, while one blended face
may please the most and offend the least, it may not much fulfill anyone. The project for volitional
evolution appears to require mass approval of particular normative criteria in order to make the
next step, that is, evolution by (unanimous?) global vote, which is cumbersome at the least.
A project supporter may concur that such a scenario is absurd and is hardly intended.9 There
are a couple of possibilities for diffusing the need for such a scenario;
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(1) Such voting is simply not even germane to the system: People are naturally geared to long
for SHIB by certain universal criteria for which evolutionary psychology can avouch
(Etcoff 1999). In this way, the project can circumvent the accusation that it creates a nor-
mative quagmire and thus puts the program back on a scientific basis. Such a tack, if
seamlessly achieved, might indeed result in the world population’s unanimously and
voluntarily conceding, without official votes, to accept a type of change in their physiol-
ogies such that these all conform to certain theories of evolutionary psychology concern-
ing criteria for human HIB. This scenario is assuming that evolutionary psychology will
one day conform normativity – across all cultures – in such a way that all persons would
voluntarily accept the discovered criteria, drop any inferior practices, and conform them-
selves. But this rationale for volitional evolution is subject to two further problems: (a) A
logical problem: It is left once again with a paradox, viz. that in taking our destinies out of
evolution’s hands, this destiny still ends up being entirely shaped and dictated by evol-
ution-till-now, which the project aims to transcend. (b) A moral problem: It creates a rela-
tively homogenous population conforming to an idealized prototype, carving off the
messy, large fringes that evolution has carelessly included. To preclude such an
outcome, the project may try to build-in a device to avoid such homogenization. Thus,
either the program as it unfolds would disallow homogenization and so preclude this
option of unanimous volunteerism as a way to retain volitional evolution, or homogen-
ization would indeed result and would make for a significantly undiversified population,
leaving the population susceptible to environmental fluctuations and thus posing a moral
problem for those who would thereby direct the population.
(2) The second scenario for avoiding the absurdity of evolution by global unanimous vote:
One aspect of our taking our destinies out of evolution’s hands is taking control of the
environment that gives rise to cultural criteria of HIB. We no longer allow the haphazard
environment which has formed and shaped evolutionary outcomes and in turn formed and
shaped culture. We build domes over cities or shields against asteroids or construct entire
planets, of which, say, every molecule and atom is put in place by nanorobots. In short,
we ensure that the environment is constructed in such a way that it favors only positive
human traits, such as HIB, and disfavors the bad ones. This way, whatever selection
which does occur via environmental influences will be favorable; and furthermore,
social selection will persevere as a strong force. However, I note that this second
option has problems similar to the first: (a) A logical problem, much like the previous.
Although the aim is to take our destinies out of evolution’s hands by thoroughly control-
ling the environment, the requirements for that environment and what counts as favorable
in whosever lights have been set by evolution-till-now. Thus, this destiny still remains
entirely shaped and dictated by evolution-till-now; so no destiny has been taken out of
evolution’s hands. (b) A moral problem. This problem includes not only one like the
moral problem for the first option, in that the cultural diversity will be severely defined
and diversity constricted. There is a further moral problem in that such constriction
may well come off to many members of the population like oppression.
The objection here harks back to an earlier point and concedes that volitional evolution is
indeed normative, if based upon a scientific notion of evolution-up-till-now (as if humans have
reached a high juncture on an evolutionary tree). By the very promotion of the innovation as voli-
tional, there is indeed normativity in the project’s enjoining others to join this project as the
optimal choice for humans. The project’s scientific basis lies in its recognizing the process of evol-
ution-till-now. It grants that evolution has molded and changed organisms until now, that this
process stands as the model and inspiration for further change in the structure and adaptability
10 L.F. Miller
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of beings, but that this change will now be done in a different manner. Thus, criticizing the project
for being normative and hence not scientific at its basis misses the project’s entire purport.
However, this objection only concurs with the view that volitional evolution is not actually a
concept of evolution as scientifically understood. Perhaps it is inspired by the story naturalists
have constructed of a nearly 4-billion year process of generating a range of beings and being-
types. Perhaps with this inspiration, a volitional-evolution project may propose to create its
own range of beings and being-types. But this proposal for such a creation cannot be, as the dis-
cussion so far has revealed, ‘evolution’ in the current scientific understanding. The project pro-
poses something else, and it would be clearer, in scientific contexts, to use a term other than
‘evolution’.
2.5. Beyond (and beneath) the planet of ‘scientific’ evolution
The objection as to whether there is a significant problem with the concept of volitional evolution
would maintain that the worry about previous biological evolution to any extent is wholly beside
the point: All that is meant by ‘evolution’ is the broader sense, that of change. It is not relevant
whether evolution-till-now shaped and dictated everything that we are, including our desire to
escape its clutches. We simply want to take all our future big changes into our own hands and
be the ones controlling those.10 Besides, if we take one proposed option, uploading our minds
into computers (Chalmers 2010), we will not even be genetically based anymore, then whatever
changes we do impose upon ourselves and our destinies can no longer be defined by genetics or
dictated by selfish genes. In that way, we transcend our pasts.
As for this line of objection, either (a) The ‘evolution’ of volitional evolution then is the quo-
tidian sense that we use every day and has always been the case, in that we seek control over the
changes in ourselves. Thus the project usage of ‘evolution’ does not convey the intended scientific
impact and, despite its users’ intentions otherwise, cannot reach beyond the common usage as
mere ‘change’, or (b) The project’s usage of ‘evolution’ is to gain, by association, the cache of
scientific ‘divergent evolution’ even if lacking the appropriate details and facts. But then, as to
precisely what the future details and facts may be, support for volitional evolution must resort
to something like: ‘Whatever our kind of “evolution” will be, it will be more impressive than
the old version and will be fashioned by our own wills and production methods’. But, lacking
scientific basis, this reply would only fall back into an obscurantism that I doubt the volitional-
evolution advocates would want.
However, to maintain scientific stature for the project, the final objection is to note that this
whole discussion is contingent merely upon current scientific understanding of ‘evolution’. As
scientific theory itself evolves and becomes more powerful, it may well incorporate the
concept of ‘evolution’ that project supporters invoke and then make the project scientific. Yet,
to bank on what a science may become, so that a concept currently outside mainstream science
may later become scientific, is taking a large gamble. (Similarly, one might hold that any
concept, such as the powers of Baal or the influences of Jupiter on Aquarius, may one day be
scientific concepts.)
I should speak to another possible interpretation of ‘volitional evolution’ that holds this notion
not as continuing evolution understood in the scientific sense but as deliberate operations upon the
human genome, body, and brain that transcend the scientific modes and definitions of evolution,
even including that of the human being as a biological species,H. sapiens. Some HIVE promoters
may intend such a broad interpretation. There are a few drawbacks to this interpretation of ‘voli-
tional evolution’. One is that, while expressly not the scientific usage, it is still too broad and
imprecise to merit as a substitute for the scientific usage. It may seem that, if HIVE projects
were indeed realized and many of these techniques were successfully marketed, halting
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evolution-as-it-is-known for human beings’ future generations, there might be a call for a scien-
tific inquiry into the nature of these entities and how one type may serve as precedent to another
type. However, even this sort of after-the-fact scientific taxonomy would be superfluous or worth-
less because in this context of HIVE, the sciences are understood as underlying and informing the
techniques; so in the production of HIVE entities – since developers, including late-generation
autonomous robots’ creating entities, are not producing entities randomly and haphazardly – it
is already understood what kind of entities are being produced and where they fit into the
overall HIVE scheme. At best, a taxonomist would serve in a kind of historical pursuit, much
as museum taxonomist classifies makes of rocking chairs or adding machines.
If human beings or the entities that some of them have made have not eliminated all other life
forms, there would still be biological evolution, which would reflect the current scientific
meaning. For whatever human-based or human-invented (or human-invented-entity-invented,
etc.) entities that remain, if they have indeed halted evolution of beings derived from humans,
they have in any event halted human evolution. Other biological species may still exist, but
(certain) human beings possibly would have disallowed humans to remain human and evolve bio-
logically. HIVE promoters intending to offer ‘volitional evolution’ should make such clarifica-
tions as I am suggesting as to what they intend or envision and be more exact than waving
hands and speaking vaguely of ‘transcending’ biological evolution and redefining ‘biological
species’. Otherwise, ‘volitional evolution’ as transcending evolution simply reflects an intention
to halt evolution and methodically produce entities based on the human being (at least initially),
but changed somehow. ‘Volitional evolution’ then reverts to merely some kind of change ‘Bio-
logical species’ is not redefined but stays intact if non-human evolved lifeforms such as
mussels and sparrows are still allowed and people are allowed to remain human and not alter
themselves or their offspring according the HIVE guidelines.
‘Volitional’ in this context of intended redefining evolution and biological species offers a
further poignant drawback. There is a lack of clarity in who exactly is willing the ‘evolutionary’
effort. Individual consumers, making whatever changes they want? As noted above, that scenario
appears to lack the coordination that orchestrated change of the species would require. Or rather,
is the ‘we’ of ‘we now control our evolution’ a coterie of industrialists and government who
decide for the population? The prospect of tyranny looms. ‘Transcendent volitional evolution’
at this juncture promises to be not transcending anything but possibly disposing of something
valuable, and not attractively volitional if volitional at all, and not evolution.
2.6. Volitional evolution’s need for clarification
The ‘evolution’ in the concept of volitional evolution cannot be microevolution, divergent evol-
ution, or speciation in the scientific sense of these concepts. Furthermore, an innovating project
based upon this concept evidently cannot sidestep the very evolutionary process that it aims to
take control of or to transcend. More broadly, since the evolutionary process is apparently
going nowhere,11 attempting to direct a process that is intrinsically non-directable is highly pro-
blematic. The one sense of ‘evolution’ that leaves the concept of volitional evolution intact is the
sense of evolution as any change, which is not a momentous sense.12 While I have not resolved
the problem of volitional evolution’s ontology in terms of solving it, I hope I have resolved it to
the extent of increasing the resolution or the detailing of the problem in terms of what kind of
changes are projected to be in store for present and future people. The work ahead is thus now
laid out for clarifying just what kind of change that the prospective innovators are attempting.
As the fully implemented innovation of volitional evolution is projected to trigger – or would
have the effect of – historical upheaval, the clearer the details of the pivotal concepts, the more
12 L.F. Miller
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
an
tz 
Fl
em
ing
 M
ill
er]
 at
 07
:51
 24
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
clearly we can project, examine, and discuss these futures. Such clarification should thus help
resolve the strong controversies surrounding such possible future innovation.
3. Volitional evolution and responsible innovation
To sum up so far, this article’s major normative concern arises from the very notion of volitional
evolution, which is fraught with conceptual and ontological problems. Proposals to effect voli-
tional evolution will not effect evolution in the scientific sense; at best they may merely halt
the evolution of species from H. sapiens. Given this fact, HIVE projects seeking to alter the
species according to someone’s idea of improvement and terming the projects ‘volitional evol-
ution’ mislead potential consumers, whether promoters are aware of the deception or not. To
give them the benefit of the doubt, we can assume they are unaware of the deception, and there-
fore are not involved in fraud. Because of the seriousness of the matter – the aim to capture con-
sumers at the very root of what kind of being they are – and the exceedingly powerful notion of
someone’s controlling the very essence of that being by conquering nature entirely and wresting
the process of evolution from it, it is time to reframe such projects as other than volitional
evolution.
This normative objective may potentially be challenged by the need to weigh it against the
ethical analysis of proposed HIVE projects themselves. That is, on one hand there is this article’s
normative concern with the precision of ‘volitional evolution’ in this scientific context. On the
other hand, there is a broader normative issue as to the ethics of such projects themselves. As
for whether such projects are ethical, ethicists range from approving to disapproving. What if
these projects are actually propitious and thereby ethically obligatory, would not this article’s
worry about a term or concept used by only some HIVE advocates be minor, if not digressive?
Even if ‘volitional evolution’ is indeed misleading, is not a little deceptive advertising virtually
acceptable, given the good that may come from the projects? This further issue is worth consider-
ation before discussing responsible innovation in terms of volitional evolution.
3.1. Related normative issues concerning HIVE and volitional evolution
Some philosophers have proposed that consumers are morally obliged to purchase and deploy
HIVE products. Savulescu (2001) contends that parents-to-be are morally obligated to use preim-
plantation genetic diagnoses to weed out bad traits and emphasize or add good ones, even if these
measures further abet social inequalities. Buchanan et al. (2000 persuasively argue that it is ethi-
cally incumbent upon human beings, for improved public health and health-care programs, as
well as personal choice and freedom, to reconfigure the human genome, heightening good
traits and eliminating bad, so as to maximize human wellbeing. Contrasted with Savulescu,
they seek to diminish social inequalities through proper genomic control. Savulescu and Bucha-
nan et al. share much with Fletcher (1988), who contends that evolution and sex over the past four
or so billion years have been sloppy ways to make beings, such as sapient, conscious, intelligent
H. sapiens, relying as evolution and sex did on chance mutation to take the next baby step in the
evolutionary line leading up to humans. Now human intelligence can and must seize careless,
amoral evolution and replace this toxic rule of chance with sober, compassionate reason,
which can do a better job.
While these different ethical exhortations to human reason in order to fashion a morally accep-
table creature based upon the human genome take slightly different angles, I try to respond to
themes that run through them all. I begin with the mildly problematic worries about these thematic
approaches and work toward the more deeply worrisome.
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One matter is a recent upsurge in inquiry into whether it is ethical willingly to bring a sentient,
conscious, intelligent being such as a human into existence in the first place (Shiffrin 1999;
Benatar 2006; Overall 2012; Miller 2013b). The problem of bringing a sentient being into exist-
ence is that the being will experience harm, so such an act is essentially creating harm for that
being. I am emphatically not advocating this view but bringing it up as one ethical challenge
for HIVE projects to handle. They must either (1) make the entities they plan not fully sentient;
so they do not experience pain of any sort and thus cannot be claimed to having been harmed by
being brought into existence, but then without full sentience they may lack some of the inter-
related traits of consciousness and intelligence; or (2) do harm by bringing these entities into
existence.
Another challenge is that of commodification of the individual. Not all HIVE promoters, par-
ticularly certain types of Libertarians, would be much concerned about commodification of any
kind, but it should at least be considered. Currently, agents even in industrial societies have the
freedom to choose to minimize their role as consumers. They are still free to denounce and
partly renounce the highly resource-intensive culture about them and strive to avoid commodifi-
cation of their lives and of life itself. However, entities fashioned by genetic manufacture, even if
government played a role alongside industry, would make that entity a commodity tout court.
Being a commodity leaves one little place to opt out of commodification, and thereby a
freedom is lost. One becomes much more enthralled to the industry/government amalgam. It
may be objected that the globe is so beholden to the industrial/governmental amalgam anyway,
it is only a small step for individuals themselves to become commodities. We should consider,
though, that this step may be small for some individuals, but it would be a giant catapult for
humanity.
One of the most indelible problems with arguments that HIVE is ethically obligatory is that of
value assignment. Buchanan et al. (2000) touch on this issue, but not from the angle I provide
momentarily. Hauskeller (2013) goes into some detail, and I refer readers to it for complementing
what I say here. The HIVE-as-morally-obligatory argument depends upon some shared theory of
the good, of what sorts of human traits are good. Either the entire population holds this theory, or
subsets of the population do. The latter case allows the kind of ‘diversity’ in HIVE entities that
may eventuate. Some groups may highly value super-intelligence, moderate statures, and
empathy; others may value emotional response to music, intensive sexuality, and religious toler-
ance. The first problem here is that what is allowed to be good within subgroups must still face a
higher level of value assessment above them that determines whether their subgroup valuing is
indeed morally permissible. For example, a subgroup may cultivate a type of racism, say a geneti-
cally founded hatred of entities who have emotional responses to music. Or, with less blatant
value transgressions, a subgroup may cultivate an intolerance for people who highly value inten-
sive sexuality. In any event, there would have to be in place an authority over the subgroups,
determining whether their values for fashioning their genetic engineering abide by a greater set
of values, and so we are back to there being a universal set of values for genetic engineering out-
comes among subgroups. Then the problem looms of just who is to determine those ‘universal’
values, and who is to enforce them.
At a more personal level, there are further valuing problems. Either (1) subgroups fashion
their new entities within strict genetic guidelines, or (2) they allow some slack. In the first
case, someone in a subgroup genetically implanting chemistry ability and tallness will just
keep producing new entities like a gene mill in perpetuity. Rigidity threatens. In the second
case, with some slack, a new entity to this subgroup may long to be a composer, but genetically
lacks the capacity and lives a life of regret. Should there then, for slacker-allowing groups, be
inbred anti-regret genetics so as to prevent such painful lives? Again, then, the prospect of elim-
inating all kinds of pain, even regret and sense of outrage and injustice, looms. The enterprise
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starts losing its allure as one creating entities of improved moral character.13 (Hauskeller 2013
provides a detailed argument for why the issue of valuing leads to inconsistency and incoherence
in terms of attempts to better humanity; I refer the reader to that work to explore further this issue
of valuing.)
Another deep concern is that of human rights. Much HIVE-as-morally-obligatory arguments
at least imply that to be consistent with human rights, parents are obliged to make their children as
genetically best as feasible within current technology. Human-rights documents so far have no
wording about people’s having the right to the best genes as possible. (For one matter, implied
above, is that what ‘best’ may consist in could vary widely culture-to-culture, and cultural
value may place as ‘best’ that which is not interfered with by technique.) Incorporating the
concept of right-to-best genes would require reworking human-rights declarations as well as
basic concepts about humans. Amending such documents per se is not the greatest challenge
here; the problem lies in thereby steamrolling over other extant rights. Human-rights theories
and declarations have built upon the foundation of what the human is as a particular kind of
being. If having the ‘best’ genes possible were to become a human right, and that were considered
a universal right, then we could be railroading over human rights to reproduction, to assembly and
personal relations (as freely pursued sex would be outlawed because it could endanger offspring’s
acquisition of the ‘best’ genes), and to group rights as guaranteed by United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, United Nations 2007) – since many groups the
world over have opted not to join industrial culture, and UNDRIP guarantees them that right
(Miller 2013a, 2014a).
While many HIVE promoters have allied themselves with political Libertarianism, ensuring
HIVE’s materialization leads to possible totalitarian outcomes. If the moral obligation of provid-
ing the ‘best’ genes were no more obligatory than telling at a party a white lie about the color of
your natural hair, then HIVE-as-morally-obligatory could escape some of the objections raised
here. However, it is implausible that a moral exhortation about not harming a new being (by
not providing the ‘best’ genes) is no more serious than such a white lie (pace Kant). In the litera-
ture are hints that such obligation could in fact be legally enforceable – and thus the objections I
lay down remain intact. The human race, facing such an enforceable law to apply to all human
beings, also faces the issue of who is the ‘we’ controlling what the human race is to change
into (Miller 2014b).
3.2. Conclusion to related normative issues concerning HIVE and volitional evolution
At this juncture, it would be most responsible for hopeful HIVE innovators and their promoters to
recognize that HIVE projects are not ‘volitional evolution’ and eliminate the concept from project
promotions. HIVE advocates could then most clearly represent their projects as the acronym itself
implies: The projects intend to deploy techniques now available or anticipated to be available
within a few decades expressly to refashion the human form such that those alterations mark
what, for the inventors, are improvements. In its publicity, HIVE advocacy would most respon-
sibly admit that the prospect of universal ‘betterments’ of this sort to the human form is fraught
with problems of: (1) how extensive these alterations will be enforced upon the human popu-
lation, whether de jure or de facto; (2) who exactly is the ‘we’ who is going to determine these
alterations upon the human form; and (3) the fact that ‘betterment’ is much more elusive and para-
doxical, in terms of realizing it on the human form, than this enticing term would lead one to
believe (see Hauskeller 2013, 2014; also Agar 2010). In short, less zealous salespersonship is
needed and in its place more sober, analytic, commonsense philosophical examination – in the
analytic tradition – of terminology and the presuppositions, logic, and argument based upon it.
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3.3. The ethics of promoting volitional evolution
If we are to take seriously the responsible-innovation idea that ‘every decision an engineer makes
has the potential for ethical implication’ (Hoople, forthcoming), then even decisions at prelimi-
nary stages, such as those at which volitional evolution has now reached, along with techniques
presumed to enable it, warrant ethical consideration.
Certainly volitional evolution would not be a single innovation but a set of interrelated inno-
vations that would contribute to and possibly be promoted as constituting volitional evolution.
Because of this unity in direction and presumed outcome, it has been useful in this article to con-
sider these as a single innovation. The previous discussion has brought up some normative issues
arising from such innovation and its promotion. Considering that entire discussion and the con-
ceptual problems it brings out in the general volitional evolution program, these difficulties bring
up further normative concern for responsibility in attempts to implement these programs.
Anticipating such an ambitious innovation as volitional evolution with an eye on assessing it
ethically brings up the degree to which innovations can be sufficiently anticipated in terms of
ethical assessment of them (Guston 2013; Nordmann 2014; Wilsdon 2014).Without going into
this debate, I should point out that one upshot of Section 2 is that we indeed cannot anticipate
this conglomerate innovation of volitional evolution because there is a good likelihood it is
simply misconceived. However, even if it is misconceived and cannot be realized as its promoters
promise, I shall argue, there is still a concern about the ethical responsibility of promoting it.
First, I start with the possibility that the analysis in Section 2 is incorrect and one day not
too far off humans will be able to will the evolution of new species from humans. To simplify
this discussion, I narrow down the possible scenarios to that in which some humans, particularly
technical innovators and industrialists, devise methods by which consumers can either them-
selves evolve into new species; so their offspring shall be new species, or only their offspring
are new species. One concern of ethical responsibility is whether parents of one species can
properly raise children of a humanlike although markedly different species. This problem
echoes the bioethics worry about raising offspring ‘more advanced’ than oneself. Solutions
seem at least conceivable, as not only may the adults have selected their offspring’s traits
and have some advance knowledge of what to expect, but concerted community efforts
along the same lines could offer needed help. More daunting is the issue of whether one
can, in an ethically responsible way, fashion a new creature who may well have rights and
emotional and material needs unpredictable from the parents’ lives or from the projections of
what kind of being is created. This problem may be more readily soluble for the case in
which the parents have chosen to be that different kind of creature and so have some idea of
this existential challenge. But in cases of making one’s offspring (or by whatever other
route) new offspring, I see no such ready out. Nature is not a moral agent and cannot be
held liable for the organisms that arise from its mix of forces; so we cannot blame nature for
creating H. sapiens or Drosophila melanogaster. Humans are moral agents and would be culp-
able for any Homo supersapiens or other new species.
Another problem is whether there can be a coherent society composed of different species,
some of which may have been designed specifically to outstrip competitively those already exist-
ing. Proposals to keep strong ‘ethical’ checks on what is created form one response to the chal-
lenge, although it is not clear if one can indeed anticipate the ethical problems that could be
encountered and thus ethically build-in the proper limitations (Nordman 2014). More tantalizing
is the fact that human societies are structured on human needs and answering these (which may
partly account for why humans have such difficulty being good stewards of the planet’s other
species because these, with the exceptions of animals domesticated to live in human society,
do not with their peculiar needs fit well under the human social umbrella). The new species
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may well have to establish a new society – but where? Other planets? There is the significant
problem of how to establish their society before they come into existence or at least reach adoles-
cence, so they will have somewhere to fit. But without already having somewhere to fit, it would
be very hard to draw up with due ethical responsibility a sociopolitical plan that could properly
accommodate them. And there would likely be more than one new species, as consumers across
the world, given usual call for freedom of marketplace, would want their own design of new
species. So the problem of responsible sociopolitical design multiplies. Even if only some con-
sumers across the globe elect to evolve or have offspring of a different species, a further consider-
ation is due. Because of these unprecedented problems of how to fit the species into the society or
a neighboring society accommodating their needs, other consumers in the world community –
particularly those not choosing volitional evolution – would be markedly affected by those con-
sumers’ electing volitional evolution. The stakeholder approach to product development
(Freeman 2008; Blok, forthcoming) and the impact such innovation may have on the world com-
munity add further incentive to question whether volitional evolution can be responsibly
implemented.
This innovation’s proceeding as planned poses significant challenges for responsible inno-
vation. But there are also challenges for the anticipated innovation if it is indeed misconceived
as Section 2 argues. Currently, volitional evolution’s supporters seemingly assume that the inno-
vation is a valid possibility. However, now that the case has been made that volitional evolution is
misconceived and does not sustain as an ontologically valid possibility, it is up to promoters to
answer these challenges to their anticipated innovation. If promoters cannot offer a sound justi-
fication for why their innovation is indeed bona fide evolution, then their product innovation
would be improperly characterized. For example, if innovators offered a product as a specific
innovation of volitional evolution, by which consumers could replace their bodies entirely with
prosthetics, the product would in fact be misrepresented as volitional evolution, since such an
innovation would have been shown to be ontologically infeasible. In this case, then, the ethical
consideration is that of untruthful marketing, when the falsehood behind this marketing is
known. It would be comparable to offering a scientifically bona fide time-traveling device
when or if it had been shown that time travel was not scientifically conceivable, within the scien-
tific understanding at the time. Such a case could even merit the label of fraud (if indeed the mar-
keter knew of the scientific invalidity but proceeded to market the product as advertised anyway,
fraud requiring deliberate, knowing deceit).
Thus, in any case, whether or not volitional evolution is an innovation that falls within the
scientific notion of evolution, it poses serious problems for responsible innovation. If it proves
to be a scientifically valid innovation and consumers can indeed create scientifically bona fide
new species from H. sapiens, there are serious problems for how the product could be
implemented with due ethical responsibility. Such responsibility includes that toward the new-
species offspring, as species until now have been brought about by other than moral agents,
because nature is not a moral agent. The responsibility also includes that toward members of
society-as-it-is, for whom there is no necessity in there being newly, deliberately evolved
species without their asking for such interference with their lives and social structures. There is
also responsibility toward the new species’ themselves, for whom the new society would face
a serious possibility that it did not fit their needs. By contrast, if the innovation is indeed scien-
tifically and ontologically misconceived, as this paper’s first two sections argued, there remains
the ethical responsibility in dubbing products as those of volitional evolution – false represen-
tation at best, fraud at worst. If volitional evolution is indeed neither a scientifically nor ontologi-
cally valid prospective innovation, the whole engineering ambition to realize volitional evolution
would best and most responsibly be dropped.
Journal of Responsible Innovation 17
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Notes on contributors
After attending Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Columbia University, Lantz Fleming Miller com-
pleted his PhD in philosophy at City University of New York. He has published a number of articles and
reviews in social and political philosophy and applied ethics and is at work on a book on a naturalistic analy-
sis of equality. He currently teaches applied ethics.
Notes
1. The concept also appears in numerous works by non-philosophers and non-scientists such as journal-
ists, as in Radical Evolution (Garreau 2005) and Designer Evolution (Young 2006).
2. ‘Emerging techniques’ are widely considered to be those of ‘high technologies’, including bioengi-
neering, genetic manipulation, cognitive pharmaceuticals, artificial intelligence, brain/computer inter-
faces, and sometimes cryogenics as a method of prolonging a person’s chances to take advantage of
future developments.
3. Hughes (2006) notes that a very similar concept predates Darwin, at least as far back as Denis Diderot
in his work D’Alembert’s Dream. Diderot argues that the mind/brain could be deconstructed and reas-
sembled in a different medium than its present one, and that by technologies people should be able to
bring the dead back to life, restructure animals and machines to make them intelligent, and redesign
humans themselves into entities ‘whose future and final organic structure it is impossible to
predict.’ (70) Other recent writers have made comparable assertions of historic roots for humanity’s
seizing control of its own form, essence, and destiny so that these may be completely manipulated;
see Bostrom (2005).
4. See Dawkins (1976) on the extent to which reproduction was a necessary condition for evolutionary
adaptation even to occur.
5. However, see Müller and Newman (2005) for whether development serves as a source of changes upon
which evolution may operate, in a developmentalistic approach to evolution.
6. Note that not all literature in this area anticipates speciation from humans; Kurzweil (2005) maintains
that posthumans, or those who follow his suggested methods, would still be human. Because this par-
ticular proposal does not appear to involve volitional evolution, it is not relevant to the present
discussion.
7. I leave aside the complication of ‘chimeras’, or organism types manufactured by the mixture of
genomes of two or more species, such as a chimpanzee blended with a snake or a giraffe with a
robin. It is still not clear that such organisms would be new species, for the same reason as associated
volitional evolution proposals discussed below. Besides the fact that it unclear how feasible such
blends would be for yielding viable, reproducing organisms, the proposal faces reservations as to
the ethical justification for the experimentation on animals needed to produce such organisms.
8. Genetic drift, a third force in evolution, involves the introduction of neutral or nonadaptive traits into a
population. See Pigliucci and Kaplan (2006) on whether genetic drift and selection are indeed separate.
9. However, Bostrom (2004) proposes a system of globally controlled evolution but without mentioning
these theoretical and practical problems of attaining normative consensus or the moral consequence for
dissenters.
10. The point here is that HIVE proponents promoting their programs as volitional evolution can mean-
ingfully do so only if the sense of ‘evolution’ used therein is the common, non-scientific sense of
simple change of any sort. This fact that volitional evolution can be meaningful only if ‘evolution’
is understood as the common one of simple change of whatever sort is not to be taken as trivial,
but only as non-scientific.
11. In the philosophy of biology literature, especially in light of the adaptationist program, there has been
extensive discussion about whether evolution can be teleological (Reiss 2009; Depew 2011). The con-
troversy concerns the degree to which evolutionary adaptations define species and organisms. As Reiss
put the problem: The observation that an organism would not exist if it did not have a certain trait is no
justification for asserting that the trait appeared because it had this beneficial character. Otherwise, in
the final picture appears the common one of evolution’s pulling the mass of organisms, over time, in a
certain direction (a tendency in thought even Darwin exhibited; see his quote in Section 1.1.). In the
scientific context, evolution is not going anywhere; the mass of organisms is not working at becoming
a certain sort of thing. Not only would this sort of teleology, in evolutionary terms, be irrelevant, but
‘directed evolution’ would be an oxymoron.
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12. Further considerations for proponents of volitional evolution: (a) How can we know what ‘evolved’
needs we will have in the future, based upon what we think – or interpret – that our current society
is and its requirements vis-à-vis our evolved state? (b) How do we know that whatever our society
may be in 200 years will have vastly different needs? (c) How can we know about vastly different
changes in the physical environment that can come about, which evolution has dealt with in its
own way in the past? (d) How do we know what to direct ourselves to be if we do not even know our-
selves or know what we are? There is a kind of embedding problem here: We always have to know
more now than we know in order to do undertake volitional evolution. That is, the horizon ever
recedes.
13. Some observers may protest this objection, saying ‘What is bad about eliminating all kinds of negative
experience, from pain to grief to regret? Why not just engineer indelibly, irreversibly pleasure-experi-
encing entities?’ The argument involved here is extensive. One simple, if flawed, argument is a reduc-
tio, concerning whether one can eliminate all negative experiences. Say you eliminate all previously
considered negative experiences, such as pain from breaking a leg, grief from losing a parent, regret
for not having gone to the bar last night to meet friends, or outrage from injustice. Now you have a
new set of a range of experiences. Some are not as good as others; so by comparison, they are negative,
and they must be eliminated. And so forth. One can thereby never find good experiences. This reductio
could be refuted by saying that not-so-good experiences are not necessarily bad; one just has a new
scale with no negative experiences on it. This objection may be refuted with a combination of the
other problems to be considered. One is the implausibility of pinpointing to all solely bad experiences
partitioned wholly from good. Outrage, for example, is uncomfortable, therefore feels negative, but as
Mill (2006) and other moral philosophers have noted, it is central to responses to injustice. Other pro-
blems include practical issues, such as, whether it is feasible to tease apart, genetically, the experience
of pleasure from non-pleasures. Another is the relativity, both individually and culturally, of what is
indeed pleasure and pain. Another is the case that poets have often considered over the centuries,
and that is whether one really can experience pleasure without there being the contrastive of pain
(this issue relates to the practical one of whether pleasure and pain, genetically, physiologically, can
be fully teased apart from the body).
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